Lee Daniel Crocker wrote,
>You're making the further unstated assumption that the success of a
>population is good; i.e., you are defining moral worth as equivalent
>to success of the species.
Yes, and you would oppose this assumption? If the success of a species (or segment of a species) does not correlate to its mores, this dysfunction places it at a disadvantage in relation to less dysfunctional populations, don't you think?
> That's as good a desire as any, but there's
>certainly nothing more fundamentally "right" about success than any
>other human desire.
Without fulfilling the desire for evolutionary success, (iow, unless a population succeeds) a population cannot go on to other human desires. This makes the desire for evolutionary success, reproductive success, sucess as a species, or however one puts it, a "fundamental" desire (as you put it).
The extent to which ethical systems originate in our genes deserves, IMO, a scientific review equal to or surpassing that given to Sokal's Experiments With Cultural Studies.