It appears as if Eliezer S. Yudkowsky <email@example.com> wrote:
|> So if the Church-Turing thesis holds for the physical world, it is a
|In one sense, yes. But (1) if the world I saw was Turing-computable, I
|probably wouldn't see anything wrong with it - *I'm* not that smart. Or
|perhaps I underestimate myself... but nonetheless, the only way I
|learned how to reason about the subject was trying to explain phenomena
|that weren't Turing-computable, i.e. qualia. And (2) if *this* world is
|Turing-computable, then obviously all my reasoning is wrong and I don't
|know a damn thing about the subject.
On what basis do you define qualia as non-Turing-computable?
|> Ever tried to rear children? Outwitting goes both ways.
|Someone tried to rear me. Perhaps I flatter myself, but my experience
|would tend to indicate that it only goes one way.
I have noticed that many grownups behave as if all children belonged to a non-sentient species when communicating with them. This would explain why some, very sentient, children outwit a great number of grownups..