> I haven't read it for a while, but Dennett made a case in
> 'Consciousness Explained' that red is not a physical phenomenon but
> merely a tag which we attach to certain stimuli.
But think about this. What is this "tag" that you talk of?
Why is it? What is it like?
In consciousness explained Dennet claims we don't really have
qualia "...it just seems that we do". But what is such a false
"seeming"?
For a representationalist, a false seeming is an internal
representation in the mind that does not accurately model what it
represents. A mirage is something in the mind that does not
accurately represent what is beyond the eyes. That is why it only
"seems" that there is water out there. There is a representation of
water in our mind, but no real water beyond our eyes.
According to this Dennett's statement is self contradictory.
He is saying we don't have representations, we just have false
representations that represent such which of course is absurd and self
contradictory. If Dennet intends some non representationalist meaning
for "seem" he should more explicitly explain what it is he means.
What, why, and how, is this knowledge that is our seeming that is
incorrect? It must be something in order for it to be incorrect
right? If it was nothing how could it be incorrect or correct?
If it is merely a "tag" what how and why is this tag? And
most importantly, what is this tag really fundamentally and
phenomenally like.
Brent Allsop