Infant animals, including the human kind, by instinct seek to gain
nourishment necessary for survival. Dogs, cats, etc. are directed by this
instinct all of their lives. I.E., survival instinct. A human individual on
the other hand is volitional and at some point in the maturing transition
has the option to choose(within capacity) to survive or choose not survive.
Although each individual is made up of characteristics, both common and
individualistic, including the urges you speak of, with the onset of the
ability to think in the abstract and make choices, there is no instinctive
directive to determine course of action.
>
>Somehow, instincts just don't quite fit into the definition of "subjective."
Granted, this is an arguable point. For sake of brevity, I didn't go into a
full explanation of complete differentiation. I don't like the premise,
"automatic values" as it sidesteps choice and subjective and you observe.
What we really have in human infants and other animals are REACTIVE
entities. Since the value is attributed by mind, although instinctively, the
source puts it in the subjective realm. That it is automatic, not subject to
choice, puts it in the objective realm. What we have is not a contradiction,
but an evolving transition of one type of animal into another and a
description of each stage as pertains to valuing. I simply do not like the
term valuing in the first stage, but have no single term to represent the
actual differentiation. We also have a situation of valuing as in the case
of a dog with survival instinct, but chooses one type of food over another.
There are separate terms needed to make a shortly worded differentiations.
Right now I can't find them in the language system and have not tried to
create such terms since this situation is not often discussed. In any event,
considering the non explanatory generality of my statement, your objection
is well warrented. However, when we leave the transition stage and deal with
human adults, the mental action of subjective valuing is quite clear.
>They exist apart from how we feel about them. To be sure, we can control our
>instinctive urges, but we still have them.
These urges you speak of are as you acknowledge at the command of individual
volition as to whether one does or does not act upon them. If we define
instinct as not subject to volition, as was done above, the urges in
question are not in the realm of instinct. This is further evidenced by the
fact that certain beliefs and valutions can psychologically negate all the
survival urges.
>They seem more like a personal
>*is* which our mind perceives as an *ought*.
>
It is a personal *is*. However, the perception of *ought* is rooted in the
"impersonal" as it presupposes a course of action and behavior set up and
sanctioned by something other than self. In formal religion, it is called
"God." Apart from formal religion, it may be called anything, or nothing at
all - except the feeling of "ought." The core question is whether the
feeling of "ought" is based on fact or fallacy. In addition to the fact that
"ought" is inconsistent with "is", my long term study of the situation
leaves me with the conclusion that the feeling of "ought" is ALWAYS based on
false beliefs. There is sometimes much difficulty in identifying these false
beliefs because they often exist in the subconscious without conscious
awareness of their nature or their effect on thinking and values. Since very
few ever study the principles of mind to understand what they believe and
why they believe it, these subconscious directive beliefs usually go
undetected throughout a lifetime.
>>Mr. Crocker wrote:
>>
>>>>And be clear what I mean here: I do not wish to test an action; the
>>>>results of an action /are/ easily testable against the outcome I
>>>>desire. I wish to test an hypothesis about which outcome I should
>>>>desire, independent of any action to achieve it.
>>
As I see it, what Mr. Crocker is saying here is that he does not contest the
fact that means may be tested (proven as suited or unsuited) in respect of
some end he chooses. The challenge is to prove the end itself is a valid or
invalid *should* choice. It can't be done because there is no objective
*should*. The theory of objective ought is in direct contradiction of the
objective fact of individual volition. Do you notice that Mr. Crocker's
statements sets means as subject to proof or disproof? To prove Mr.
Crocker's choice of ends as right or wrong, isn't it necessary to regard Mr.
Crocker's choice of ends as means to some other end not his own? Even the
words themselves throw out an "ought" as objective. To wit. Objective
reality IS. To say "ought" is objective is to say objective reality IS and
IS NOT. It just won't fly.
>>You responded:
>>
>>>You should desire species survival, without which we wouldn't be having this
>>>discussion.
>>
>>I see your end desire stipulated and implicitly coupled with the wish that
>>Mr. Crocker attribute value to the end you name. What is missing is why he
>>should do so other than to please you.
>
>To not be in conflict with what is probably his most basic instinctive
>value. To please himself.
>
If it were an "instinctive value" it would not be subject to choice, would
it? Wouldn't this mean the value already exists for Mr. Crocker and the
"should" has no meaning? As for pleasing himself, each of us seeks self
interest at all times. Aren't you really presuming to decide Mr. Crocker's
choice for him? Isn't this a contadiction?
>>Where is recognition of Mr. Crocker's
>>choice in the matter? The reality is that Mr. Crocker does have a choice and
>>to not recognize it, whether it pleases you or not, is not dealing with AS
>>IS, but denial of AS IS, which is to say, denial of the existent, Mr.
>>Crocker.
>
>His instincts are a part of him, and yet he cannot change them through his
>choices, only be in compliance or conflict with them. They are AS IS.
>
As concluded above, urges are not necessarily instincts as in infants, but
may derived from underlying beliefs. So, there never is the question or
circumstance of being in conflict with instincts since they are by nature
guaranteed.
>>This is literally what every claim of discovered "objective value"
>>does. In other words, the concept, objective value, is an illusion and
>>inherently anti individual.
>
>Instincts are an AS IS part of the individual.
>
See above. To recap. You acknowledge that one can choose to ignore what
you're calling instincts. Since you can do this by subjective choice,
doesn't this reveal that what you're calling instincts are not really
objective, nor an objective mandate?
>>It is my personal preference that the terms, ought and should, be entirely
>>eliminated from the language. Getting rid of these non scientific terms
>>would no doubt aid in holding focus upon the reality of a thing or
>>situation. Having expressed this desire, I remain aware that my end chosen
>>is not the end desire of most. Consequently, I will continue to deal with
>>the real by exposing the fact that ought and should have no connection to
>>objective reality except as personal preference and subjective declarations.
>
>Are not instincts part of objective reality?
>
Yes, but the question is, what part, and how does this part relate to the
issue of values? I know of no instincts of anything that supports the idea
of should or ought. The belief in "ought" as consistent with objective
reality, but dependent only upon a subjective feeling leaves all that
believe shouting "ought" at each other without any objective, i.e,, common
frame of reference to peacefully resolve the difference. Believing the
"ought" is objective is a psychologial "order" to act upon it. What this
action is and how it is manifested necessarily varies with each individual.
One may retreat to a monastery to comtemplate the "spiritual" because he
feels he "ought" to follow this course to please "God." Another may feel
he\she "ought" to kill his\her children because they will be better off in
"heaven". Another may feel he "ought" to devote his life to aiding the ill.
Still another may feel he "ought" to eliminate racial impurity and promote
racial superiority because it is "God's will."
Always is the "ought" tied to something not individual, but felt to exist
and be superior to idividual. Its a short step from "God's will" to "for the
good of the country." Then there is "human rights", "values of society", and
so on expressed or implied as a superior being to which individual is
subordianted giving rise to the "ought." There are those that consciouly
reject the idea of an omni god and "God's will." Some go on to reject
"government" "society" as things of volition and will. Yet, after all this
remains the feeling of "moral ought." Why? Where does it come from? What
end does it serve in the promotion?
Whose end?
The feeling is a residual from a dominant belief in a superior being and
subordination of individual. It has no name, no face, no conscious recognition.
It is a haunting specter that emanates from the nearly universal and
saturate philosophy of anti individual. The formal preaching and teaching,
and the informal promotion of "divine abstracts", manifested not only in
words, but the entire socio\economic\political system that blankets the
earth, makes no concession to individual as the real. Look and listen. Where
do you see or hear of individual as the absolute real? If I were to tell you
that in your own mind you don't exist; not as the absolute real, not as the
uncaused cause so to speak, you would probably think I'm nuts, for you are
absolutely certain of your individual existence. O.K. Tell me of the source
of the "moral ought" you feel to exist? Do not tell me of your ends and
submit proof of means. This is not the issue. I wish to know of the common,
universal, not individually designated end that must exist to give objective
and definitive meaning to "ought."Can you do this without expressing or
implying a "superior being" in the background as the necessary cause of the
"objective value?"
Delmar England