Steve Nichols wrote:
>
> >
> > Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2000 15:21:32 -0500
> > From: "John Clark" <jonkc@worldnet.att.net>
> > Subject: Re: Immortality
> >
> > Steve Nichols <steve@multisell.com> Wrote:
>
> >Some thermostats alter the absolute temp they switch on at depending on
> >ambient temperature (i.e. depending on humidity). Some even do this
> >variably based on time of day, and depending on whether the room is
> >occupied, and occupied by particular people.
>
> If they are making these decisions, however complex, from programming,
> then they are finite-state. If they are altering their circuitry in response
> to
> feedback loop from the environment, then they might be infinite-state
> (analog).
This is not consistent. A program is nothing more than a mathematical
circuit, and a circuit is really nothing more than a program encoded in
hardware. Either both are finite state or both are infinite state. What
you call analog is actually digital given a small enough level of
resolution.
There is a finite number of neurons in the brain, a finite number of
synapses any one neuron can have at any given time, and a finite number
of neurons that a synapse can transmit to at any given time. Given a
finite life span of a brain, then the brain is a finite state piece of
hardware. Even if the brain is immortal, it is still finite state given
a finite lifespan to the universe. Thus, your argument is dismantled.
>
> >Human brains are not infinite state either, and you still have not
> >provided any evidence that they are in fact conscious.
>
> Human brains are 'plastic' and rewire their circuitry. This is
> not disputed by anybody, except by you it seems.
see above. Being plastic is a far far cry from being infinite state.
>
> >
> > Turing machines are hard-wired and cannot evince PHASIC
> > TRANSIENT behaviour ... correct me if I am wrong? R.E.M.
> > as I would claim is a random-like phenomena because E-1
> > brains are still (in long evolution terms) changing from finite to
> > infinite-state.
>
> random-like is not the same as random.
>
> You are avoiding the point ... besides, perhaps pure randomness
> is just a concept and does not exist in nature? Rapid eye movements
> *seem* random in the same way that phasic transients *seem* random.
Quantum indetermininance and entanglement phenomena display randomness.
Since as I demonstrate above, human brains are not infinite state, I
rest my case.
>
> > >Consciousness requires a degree of self-organisation.
> > Ah, first they must self organise, then they must be
> self-disorganised... You seem confused.
>
> In order to make an *independent* response to the environment some
> degree of "self" (organisation/ choice/ reaction) seems necessary.
> A robot that blindly follows a set of instructions and cannot make
> independent volitions has no "self" or central executive, but is just a slave machine.
Your idea of a robot's potential capabilities (given future technology)
are far more narrow minded than my ideas of human mentation.
> Yes, the ability of the brain to self-organise (or internally organise, if
> you dislike
> the term "self") is basic .. and indeed, human embryos spend up to 24 hrs a
> day
> in REM before birth at certain stages, and well after birth the neuronal
> circuits
> form and reform. There is a massive volume of data on ontogeny ... if you
> insist I
> will bore this list with reams of references?
>
Bore me.
> >
> > The debate seems to centre on the problems resolving Leibnitz Law ...
> > that to be truly "identical" the two things in question must be fully
> > interchangeable. Sense-data (experience) and the conscious sensor/ self
> > seem to be different types ... this is the problem for brain-mind identity
> > theorists. However, MVT explains the virtual sensor(gan), the phantom
> median
> > eye, which gives the persistent experience of self in terms of generation
> (action
> > potential signals &c) of the *same* generic neuronal information as the
> sense-data
> > (contents of consciousness).
>
> >I don't think so. Identity is not an issue of consciousness, it is an
> >issue of discretion.
>
> The loci of experience, and the mechanisms that give rise to it are
> very pertinent to the parallel discussion about uploading &c. Cogito ergo
> sum.
Sure, but that has nothing to do with a debate about human versus AI
'conciousness'.
>
> >
> > This is a major reason why MVT is important, most theories of mind
> > (including
> > Descartes' dualist account) fail on this point. Brains are necessary, but
> > not
> > sufficient for consciousness (they could be in mu-state ... don't you
> > agree?)
>
> >You have to be kidding. Brainless awareness? Excuse me? Cites please,
> >cites.
>
> What I am saying is that brain-dead (mu-state) means NO awareness.
> The brain is not only a circuit, but needs to be in infinite state. I tend
> to
> think insect neuronal clusters, and even hagfish & lampreys (E-2 brains)
> are not conscious. If the word conscious is a problem, use sentience or
> even qualify as "self-referential consciousness."
Since a brain is not an infinite state entity, your statement is
incorrect.
>
> >
> > As to whether I can *prove* that you are conscious (whoever "me/ you" are)
> > ... I don't want to get bogged down in individual cases because of the
> > problem
> > of solipsism. Do you accept that dreams happen? If you do, then you are
> > allowing me that the dreamers (in general, whether birds, mammal, or
> *you*)
> > have consciousness.
>
> Do you claim that dreams are anything more than automated backup/sorting
> of buffer data stored in short term memory?
>
> Yes, I agree with Globus (Real Time Hypothesis) that REM occurs during the
> day
> but is harder to detect, and with Aristotle that we are nearer to our true
> "self"
> when dreaming and mentation is not interrupted by external 'noise.' I also
> agree
> partly with Freud, and think that dreams are a way of rehearsing behaviour
> (such
> as sex) without taking risk of actually engaging in the world. We build and
> destroy
> models of reality when dreaming ... I also think that consolidation and
> reinforcement of
> memory (and discard activity) happens during dream, both REM and non-REM.
>
> Your view is too narrow, and ignores loads of evidence. But at least you
> accept
> dreams (a form of conscious event) occur!
Rehearsing is another possible use of rem. Given your reference to
foetal rem behavior, this can easily, though, be explained as the fetus
learning to sort through and make sense of sensory data, creating
circuitry to deal with what is at first incomprehensible mishmash. How
would you feel if the only input you received for days on end was like a
combination of a static picture with twenty different stations mixed
together? Making sense of input by trying out various neural
configurations until one is comprehensible seems to fit the data well.
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