Re: Immortality

From: Michael S. Lorrey (mlorrey@datamann.com)
Date: Wed Dec 13 2000 - 14:03:15 MST


Steve Nichols wrote:
>
> Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2000 15:21:32 -0500
> From: "John Clark" <jonkc@worldnet.att.net>
> Subject: Re: Immortality
>
> Steve Nichols <steve@multisell.com> Wrote:
>
> >Name me any finite-state components that can readjust their logic in
> >response to the environment
>
> >A thermostat.
>
> A thermostat is set to switch on or off at a given (preset)
> temperature. It cannot decide to override this setting, so
> does not make this "decision" internally. So this example
> could not be more wrong. Finite-state, yes, infinite-state
> capacity ... definitely not! If a thermostat can alter its own
> settings, then it is infinite-state by definition.

Some thermostats alter the absolute temp they switch on at depending on
ambient temperature (i.e. depending on humidity). Some even do this
variably based on time of day, and depending on whether the room is
occupied, and occupied by particular people.

>
> >I say you can't because finite-state means pre-set switching.
>
> >Nonsense, Turing showed in 1930 that you the only way to know
> >what a Turing machine is going to do is run the program and see,
> >and a Turing machine is finite state unless it runs for an infinite
> >amount of time.
>
> Turing machines are neither conscious, nor infinite-state.
> Digital computers tends to be finite-state, whereas analog(ous
> to infinite-state) evolvable hardware is more like our brains.
> I cite Inman & Thompson's work with R.G.A. circuits at COGS,
> University of Sussex.

Human brains are not infinite state either, and you still have not
provided any evidence that they are in fact concious.

>
> Turing machines are hard-wired and cannot evince PHASIC
> TRANSIENT behaviour ... correct me if I am wrong? R.E.M.
> as I would claim is a random-like phenomena because E-1
> brains are still (in long evolution terms) changing from finite to
> infinite-state.

random-like is not the same as random.

> >Consciousness requires a degree of self-organisation.
>
> >You mean like amorphous mater molecules forming into a crystal
> >when things get cold?
>
> For a start, we are talking about brains here ... and brains have/
> require a degree of plasticity. Inhibition and other effects allow the
> neuronal circuitry of the brain to change .. so the brain is
> self-organising.
> Your water example is meaningless.

Ah, first they must self organise, then they must be
self-disorganised...
You seem confused.

>
> > I don't want to get bogged down in semantics here .... so I claim that
> REM
> >(rapid eye movement) indicates dream mentation.
>
> >You are free to claim whatever you like but I asked how are you going to
> prove
> >I'm conscious. You still haven't answered me. And even in the unlikely
> event
> >the "lost pineal eye" is somehow important, who cares, how would that
> "fact"
> >effect the debate we were having in the slightest degree?
>
> The debate seems to centre on the problems resolving Leibnitz Law ...
> that to be truly "identical" the two things in question must be fully
> interchangeable. Sense-data (experience) and the conscious sensor/ self
> seem to be different types ... this is the problem for brain-mind identity
> theorists. However, MVT explains the virtual sensor(gan), the phantom median
> eye, which gives the persistent experience of self in terms of generation (action
> potential signals &c) of the *same* generic neuronal information as the sense-data
> (contents of consciousness).

I don't think so. Identity is not an issue of conciousness, it is an
issue of discretion.

>
> This is a major reason why MVT is important, most theories of mind
> (including
> Descartes' dualist account) fail on this point. Brains are necessary, but
> not
> sufficient for consciousness (they could be in mu-state ... don't you
> agree?)

You have to be kidding. Brainless awareness? Excuse me? Cites please,
cites.

>
> As to whether I can *prove* that you are conscious (whoever "me/ you" are)
> ... I don't want to get bogged down in individual cases because of the
> problem
> of solipsism. Do you accept that dreams happen? If you do, then you are
> allowing me that the dreamers (in general, whether birds, mammal, or *you*)
> have consciousness.

Do you claim that dreams are anything more than automated backup/sorting
of buffer data stored in short term memory?



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