Re: Immortality

From: Harvey Newstrom (mail@HarveyNewstrom.com)
Date: Sat Dec 09 2000 - 15:08:12 MST


At 12:34pm -0500 12/9/00, John Clark wrote:
>Jason Joel Thompson <jasonjthompson@home.com> Wrote:
>
> > You're dodging the issue. I'm not disputing that it is a digital
> > equivalent. I'm asking whether they are the SAME thing, or
>are, instead,
> > two instances.
>
>I'm not dodging the issue, I said as clearly as I know how to that
>if it's digital it's
>the same thing.

I think his question was: After copying, are there one or two
people? You seem to keep saying that there is one person. If this
is the case, why do you claim the copy process worked at all if there
is still just one person? Why can't you admit that this person you
claim at least has two bodies after the copy whereas he only had one
before the copy. Surely you can admit that *something* can be
counted as two things in this experiment!

-- 
Harvey Newstrom <HarveyNewstrom.com>



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