Re: TO: Joe Dees - Mu-shin

Joe E. Dees (joedees@bellsouth.net)
Sun, 26 Sep 1999 20:03:54 -0500 

Date sent:      	Sun, 26 Sep 1999 19:28:51 -0400
From:           	Robert Owen <rowen@technologist.com>
Subject:        	Re: TO: Joe Dees - Mu-shin
To:             	extropians@extropy.com
Send reply to:  	extropians@extropy.com



> > > J. The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind asserts that the belief that

> > >    one possesses a self is a delusion; that the self is, in

> > >    reality, nothing.

> > >

> > > B. Let me rephrase this for the sake of illustration: No-Mind
> > > asserts that the dreamer is the dream, the dancer is the
> > > dance, the hearer is the sound, the perceiver is the
>
> > > I have yet to see a waltz without a waltzer.
>
> Of course I would reply: You have yet to see a waltz
> without waltzing.
>
The waltz, the waltzing and the waltzer are distinguishable yet inseparable components of the performance; none of them can exist independent of either of the others.
>
> > > The perceiver is NOT the perception!
>
> Petitio Principii.
>
Two different people can perceive the same rock, so clearly the perception of the rock is independent of either. When other people, or other rocks, may be substituted, it cannot be said that either is reduceable to the other; neither can it be said that either is nothing, for there is no such thing as substitution for nothing.
>
> I would suggest that the burden of proof is upon you: that is,
> to prove "dualism" is a true theory of reality, and to demonstrate
> how you know that. My statements are based on empirical con-
> siderations; that is, I assert that the truth or falsity of any
> proposition whose content is based on what cannot be experienced
> is and must be indeterminate.
>
I never asserted dualism; if you think I did, I would like you to show me exactly where I did, or retract the claim. Besides, if I asserted anything of the sort (which I won't), I would not use a reductionistic archetype such as dualism, for the true linguistic and ideological tension is not between unity and duality (as the dialectical Hegel would have us believe), but between unity and multiplicity, with the actual procession of affairs subsisting beneath either of these imposed labels.
>
> This is what Kant's "noumenon" was all about; since he regarded
> "objective experience" as "phenomenal" (i.e. appearance only)
> then like you he must also assume there is an "unexperienced
> somewhat" of which the "object" is an "appearance". You, in
> effect, keep saying "x is an appearance; ergo, there must exist a
> y such that y is what appears as x", i.e. is a fallacious argument
> involving Petitio Principii -- that is, you continually assume that
> which is to be proved.
>
You continually deny that without which *you* cannot assert anything, i.e. your self. If you insist that the self is an illusion, then you are asserting that multiple distinct selves, with differing points of view, cannot exist. Therefore you prove my point every time you disagree with me. You also insist that all is appearance and nothing is reality. Well, we draw our concepts from our percepts; therefore our only referent for the term "reality" is our own experience. To deny that our experience is real (since there seems to be nothing outside our experience - once we perceive something new, it too is inside - to which we may compare our experience, much less call "real" instead) involves a cognitive confusion.
>
> > > ...the presence of thought logically entails the existence of
> > > a self who thinks (the thinker of the thought).
>
> Petitio Principii.
>
Nevertheless true. It is the nature of thought that it be thought by a thinker. The thinker-thinking-thought system, just like the perceiver- erceived system, cannot survive the loss of any of its components.
>
> > > If there is no dreamer, there cannot be a dream. If there is a
> > > dream, there must be a dreamer. Likewise, awakening can occur
> > > only when someone is awakened.
>
> Petitio Principii.
>
See above, and substitute dreamer - dreaming - dream.
>
> > > J. On the other hand, if one does not possess a self, then no
> > > delusion can occur, either, for delusion requires a self in
>
> Petitio Principii.
>
See above, once again (although in this case, a Cosmic Deluder is not required).
>
> > > J. There must be a believer for a belief to occur, and a
> > > nonexistent belief cannot be deluded
>
> Petitio Principii.
>
See above, substituting believer - believing - belief.
>
> > > The eye cannot see itself, but its seeing refers necessarily to a
> > > seer as surely as it refers to a seen.
>
> Petitio Principii. Dualism is inherent in all Germanic and Romance
> languages. "My eyes are blue." assumes the eyes belong to a
> hypothetical somebody, i.e. your "self".
>
That's because there is a necessary self-referentiality entailed by the use of the personal pronoun "my". This corresponds to a state of affairs which can be verified or falsified as to color (assuming that I'm not blind) every time I look in the mirror, and to self-reference by my understanding that it is me who so looks at my own face's reflection.
>
> > > The epithet of "dualistic" is a common Zen ploy with which its
> > > practitioners attempt to dismiss what they cannot refute.
>
> To a certain extent, I agree; it assumes that "monism" is the case.
> But the intellectual problem of "the denial of dualism implies the
> affirmation of monism" is, again, based on the Law of Contradiction
> and the Law of the Excluded Middle -- another dualistic Petitio Principii.
>
The answer is neither dualism nor monism, which are human labels whivh warp that upon which they are imposed; it lies beneath both.
>
> > There is a way around the conundrum, but you ain't found it yet. I'll
> > give you another chance; if you don't find it then, I'll go ahead and
> > tell you.
>
> I haven't found it because it only exists as an epiphenomenon of your
> illusory assumptions. I do not mean this disrespectfully: what is intend-
> ed is simply the assertion that on empirical grounds neither dualism nor
> monism are descriptions of experience. Further, the concept of "self"
> has no experiential referent substantively but can only intend the vocal-
> ized or sub-vocalized statement: "My self is thinking of itself" or "I think
> therefore I exist therefore I think therefore...". By an "illusion" I mean
> "that which is experienced as an image without any referent except
> itself but is belived to exist in an assumed "external world", in other words,
> a mirage. Again, Petitio Principii -- "external to what?" But that which
> is "internal" of course.
>
Excuse me, but if there is no self, exactly what is doing all this assuming, experiencing and intending ("YOUR illusory assumptions", "but can only intend", "that which is experienced")? You cannot even discuss such a denial without miring yourself in blatant self-contradiction (which, however, has never troubled Zen practitioners too much, I suppose).
>
> Thus, the "self" is a mirage if taken as more than a cognition; of course
> if you regard "external" things as "objects" then there MUST be a "sub-
> ject" -- this is the first assumption of all dualism. If there is no "self"
> then we are unjustified in saying either that it is "nothing" or "something".
> In paradoxical form, "The self is nothing only if it is something." The
> evident inconsistency of this statement underlies all the "ontological
> arguments" invoked to prove the existence of God (or, in your case,
> the "Self").
>
All consciousness is consciousness OF. Of what? Why, other- than-self (even if that other is a self-concept). The existence of intention demands that there be an intended which is distinct enough fron the intender for perspective to be established. A belief in some god or other (which I do not possess) is not equivalent to a recognition of either oneself or one's surroundings, and it is a red herring to attempt to equate such things.
>
> However this may be, if your "way around" assumes dualism, but asserts
> logically that you cannot use "nothing" as a predicate "nothing" (c.f. the
> Petitio Principii fallacy upon which all ontological proofs depend); or if,
> on the contrary, it does not, then I would like to witness it for myself.
>
My way around it is to chastize most buddhist for commiting the fundamentalist fallacy, and taking things literally and uncritically. The self is no-thing, i.e. NOT A THING, but existence is a wider class than mere thinghood. The self does not exist in the same way that a rock does, as a static facticity; self is a dynamic and recursive becoming system (cf. emergent materialism), which perdures as an not as material does, but as an evolving pattern organizing the 3 pounds of electrochemical material from which it emerges (the brain). We are self-consciously aware not because we are deluded, but because the product of the number of neurons in our brains and the complexity of their axonal and synaptic connections has breached the Godelian limit, beyond which selfreference manifests.
Godel's Incompleteness Theorems I and II are the most important mathematical theorems of the twentieth century, but their application to conscious self-awareness is not yet widely understood. First let me demonstrate the essence of Godel's work to you. It is breathtakingly simple, yet profound. Let us postulate axiomatic System A, and assert that all true statements are included in it, and no false ones. Now we create Statement B. This statement is self-referential; it talks about itself. In effect, what Statement B says is that "Statement B is not an axiom of System A." What has happened here? Well, if we include Statement B in System A, then System A contains a false statement, but if we exclude Statement B from System A, then there is a true statement which System A does not contain. Either Statement B both does and doesn't belong in System A, or it neither belongs nor doesn't belong in System A, and this paradox is unresolvable within axiomatic System A. In other words, when the a system achieves sufficient complexity to allow for selfreference, truth and completeness become mutually exclusive; no self-referential system can be simultaneously completely correct and complete. The bottom falls out; mathematics is revealed to be a Zen koan. But what does all this have to do with selfconsciousness ? Quite simply, WE ARE "B" STATEMENTS". We have evolved sufficient complexity to surpass/breach/transcend the Godelian complexity limit and have become self-referential; for this reason, "neti, neti" makes sense. We are not the world, and yet we are not-not the world. Between (and beneath) the absolute and noumenal limits of absolute self-world bifurcation (dualism) and absolutely seamless self-world identity (monism) is where we are; the self-world complexure is a dynamic and recursive nexus of systemic interrelation (not one, not two). This is how the self can be no-thing, and yet be more than nothing; it is the way out of the ligical conundrum, which, being static logic, belongs exclusively to the abstract ideal realm of Being, and neither partakes of nor circumscribes the concrete becoming reality of experience.

> Thanks for the intellectual stimulation, whatever you are,
>
You're welcome.
>
> Bob (your hypothetical and undemonstrable correspondent)
>
Joe (your interlocuter himself).
> =======================
> Robert M. Owen
> Director
> The Orion Institute
> 57 W. Morgan Street
> Brevard, NC 28712-3659 USA
> =======================
>
>
>
>