Dan Fabulich, <daniel.fabulich@yale.edu>, writes:
> However, as regards ethics, it is certainly wrong, ethically speaking, to
> conclude that ethics is a circular/pointless endeavor. I've made this
> argument several times on this list before; Eliezer uses a similar
> argument as the underpinning of his theory of the Interim Meaning of Life.
>
> Basically, the idea is this: ethical theories describe what action we
> should perform. So suppose we're trying to decide between action A and
> action B. Let's also suppose that we have an Ethical Theory (tm) which
> claims that we should perform action A.
An ethical theory "E" can then be considered a way of ranking actions, given the circumstances. E is perhaps an algorithm or formula which, given the situation, can tell which action is ranked highest.
Note that this is a fairly permissive definition, since it would include a number of rankings which do not have anything to do with ethics. However I am not sure how to tighten it up without making it circular (i.e. saying that E tells how "ethical" things are doesn't seem to help).
> Now consider the possibility that the whole ethical question is
> necessarily circular in nature, and that therefore it does not matter what
> we decide.
The way I see this is, we hope that there is a "best" ethical theory out there, which we might call E* (E-star). Our ethical theories E1, E2, E3, ... are, we hope, converging on E*. As we learn more we improve our ethical theories and eventually we may come up with the perfect one.
If this is not the case, there is no E*. There is no best ethical theory, and any ranking is as good as any other ranking.
> Well, the possibility that "it doesn't matter" does not
> provide me with any reason to make any decision over any other; if my
> theory tells me to choose A, I'm not going to choose B simply because it
> doesn't matter which I choose. More to the point, the claim that "it
> doesn't matter" will NEVER give me ANY reason to change my mind either
> way; thus, when making a decision, this possibility drops out of the
> equation. Thus, I can always ACT as if (ie assume that) the ethical
> question is not pointless, as long as there is some possibility that it
> isn't.
It seems to me that if you go back to your first point, if you are following an ethical theory E, you have a ranking and you know what to do. If your justification in following E was the hope that it is an approximation to E*, and you now deny that hope, then you are no longer justified in following E. You suggest that you might as well follow E anyway, because:
If E* exists, and E is a good approximation to it, then what E selects is a good thing to do; if E* doesn't exist, then what E selects is no worse than anything else.
The problem I see with this is that if you are willing to consider the possibility that E* doesn't exist, it would follow that your whole program of believing in E was so fundamentally misguided. If you are willing to consider such a big leap from your premises, isn't it incumbent upon you to consider the smaller leap that says that E is not a good approximation to E*?
You are arguing that the possibility that there is no E* should not change you from following E. But if you consider that as a realistic possibility, you must consider the possibility that E is a totally incorrect ethical system as an even more realistic possibility. In that case you should certainly not follow E.
What evidence do we have, really, that E or any other ethical system is an approximation to E*? It seems to me that whatever reasoning would eventually establish the existence of E*, it is far beyond anything philosophers have come by to date. It may be that E* is simply ultimate selfishness, or a devotion to total destruction. We have no evidence one way or the other.
> Thus, unless you are absolutely certain that no action is better than any
> other, even if it's only better from your perspective, (which is a pretty
> implausible view to take, IMO,) you should not conclude that ethics is a
> pointless endeavor. And, thus, we can safely assume that the question of
> ethics is not circular.
> Of course, this proof doesn't tell you which theory of ethics is actually
> correct, but it does at least show that the project is not hopeless.
Hal