Joseph Sterlynne wrote,
>If philosophy defines the terms used in science what, then, is the means by
>which these philosophical arguments are made? It seems that all
>philosophical questions ultimately become translated into scientific ones.
>This is readily apparent if one looks at the philosophy of mind literature
>today. But what is the argument that this is not happening or will not
>happen to that more general truth-searching or -defining sector of
>philosophy? That, too, is translatable into empirical terms. If you want
>to know the conditions of truth you have to know what the knower of truth
>knows. So you have to know the construction of the knower. For philosophy
>to judge the foundations of logic it must use some formal system. Which
>logic does it use?
In further support of your comments (IFSOYC): Philosophy does not define the terms used in science. (Ex. gluon, microtubule, quasar, etc.) Science not only defines its own terms, it organizes them into a grid of empirically verifiable knowledge such that anyone with sufficient intelligence and persistence can find out for themselves, experimentally, physically, directly. Science discovers, philosophy broods (IMNSHO). If you want to know the conditions of ultimate truth, that very desire gets in the way of it. Self-knowledge occurs when the observer becomes the observed. This surpasses logic and moves to direct experience (i.e., science). You can verify this for yourself using what subjective scientists generally call meditation (in English), which requires no definition, only directions.