J.M.Legg writes:
>> >> It's irrational for the mind cores to agree to disagree about the
>> >> rationality of either of their modules.
>> >
>> >What I think you should be saying is that there is an inability to make the
>> >measurements of irrationality because of the secretive person's unwillingness
>> >to be measured.
>>
>> No that's not what I meant at all.
>
>Sorry I should have said I presumed it isn't what you meant, but should have; -
>because it makes sense. At least you should have considered saying 'not rational'
>instead of or as opposed to irrational; - this is from the point of view of the
>trinary circuit. (1,0,-1 where rational = 1, not rational = 0, and irrational =
>-1.)
>
>Are we talking about the same thing?
I'm not sure what you are saying. But let me rephrase myself: If two people are agreeing to disagree about the rationality of one of them because that person in question has information not available to the other person, at least one of them is making a fundamental cognitive error. One can better get what one wants (i.e., be more rational) by avoiding this error. (Btw, an older version of my paper is at http://hanson.berkeley.edu/calibration.ps I'll have a better version in a few days.)
Robin Hanson
hanson@econ.berkeley.edu http://hanson.berkeley.edu/
RWJF Health Policy Scholar, Sch. of Public Health 510-643-1884
140 Warren Hall, UC Berkeley, CA 94720-7360 FAX: 510-643-2627