Randall R Randall <email@example.com> writes:
> Unfortunately, much of *my* discomfort with
> this lies in my ignorance of how consciousness
> works. I think if we understood it, I'd be able to
> delineate exactly where the problem lies.
This may be my problem as well. Until I have some proof that the other entity is me, I will give up my current will to live. Not being able to prove that it isn't me, isn't enough. I have to stop experiencing me as only this body, and somehow start experiencing me in the other body. If my perceptions don't transfer, then I don't feel that the "me" has transferred.
Maybe that is the key. A copy is a copy. It is not movement of anything from me to the new body. What if the new body immediately malfunctions and dies? Will I feel that I am dead. No, I'm still alive in my original body the same as I always was. Nothing has changed for me. Even if the copy doesn't die, nothing has changed for me.
> however, so I will be satisfied if
> during the upload, the uploadee is fully
> conscious at all times, and at no point in
> the upload are there two complete copies
> of the uploadee. That is, a neuron by
> neuron upload, while conscious, would be
> fine, I think.
This might help me as well. It is the creation of two versions of me, each supposedly equally valid, and then the killing of one of them that bothers me. If every neuron of my brain were replaced by an artificial neuron, one at a time, I would feel like it was still me. It is the point at which we go to kill a sentient being that bothers me. (Especially when I am currently that sentient being!)
-- Harvey Newstrom <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org> Author, Engineer, Entrepreneur, <http://www.gate.net/~harv> Consultant, Researcher, Scientist. <ldap://certserver.pgp.com>