On Mon, 6 Jul 1998, Randall R Randall wrote:
> Yes, and that is what I would disagree with.
> I know that it is not usually useful to consider
> two instances of an "object" as two separate
> objects, but it seems to me that they most
> certainly are. We can only assume that they
> are the same object because they perform
> in the same way, on the level we care about.
John Clark's "Waiting for Zed" has a good discussion about The Identity of
Indiscernables: that if two things cannot be told apart from one another,
then they are the same. Take a look at this at:
> Right, except for certain purposes (which is
> usually all that matters).
Which purposes? And for that matter, why should we adopt a definition of the word "same" which doesn't ever describe anything? I'd much rather say that any two things which can't be differentiated are the same and leave it at that.
> Since he has stopped having
> thoughts indefinitely, how does
> his plight differ from the same
> stopping of existence without
> copies? *He* is still quite dead.
Except what's that thing over there having thoughts and (up until recently) indiscernible from the man on the floor? *Him*, I'd say.