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Is there really such a thing as altruism in the
strong sense? Can there actually be something like "good moral behavior",
if such is only a matter of group affiliation? Can morality and
unselfishness really be reduced to a kind of hedonic calculus of "within
group niceness"? If this is all we humans are capable of, then how could any
human have come to the conclusion that it was not only possible, but
necessary, to love one's enemies as one loves oneself? Are we forever
destined to "between group nastiness"?
Subject: Altruism in Groups: Evolutionary Biological and Psychological
Evidence
Email: oordt@enc.edu
Seventy years ago, A. N. Whitehead wrote that "the art of life is first to
be alive, secondly to be alive in a satisfactory way, and thirdly to acquire
an increase in satisfaction." Some contemporary evolutionary theorists have
maintained that only the individual who is selfish in every respect will
survive and thrive in what Whitehead called the art of life. Elliott Sober
and David Sloan Wilson beg to differ.
In their widely influential book, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology
of Unselfish Behavior (1998), Sober and Wilson use research and reason to
reshuffle the biological and psychological cards when addressing prevailing
scientific assumptions about altruism and egoism. The hand they play makes
their book, as Jeffrey Schloss proclaims, "one of the most controversial and
significant books to emerge on human evolution, and on altruism, since the
sociobiological revolution."
Because this book has exerted broad influence in the few years since being
published, I offer this summary review to those wanting to keep abreast of
significant developments related to science and religion concerns.
Sober and Wilson argue that evolutionary theory solves problems related to
biological and psychological egoism and altruism. The authors state
succinctly the book's agenda by claiming that "the case for evolutionary
altruism requires showing that group selection has been an important force
in evolution. The case for psychological altruism requires showing that an
ultimate concern for the welfare of others is among the psychological
mechanisms that evolve to motivate adaptive behavior" (6-7).
The focal point of the evolutionary solution they propose is group selection
theory. In short, the theory says that individuals sometimes act
altruistically toward fellow members within the group of which they are a
part so that the group as a whole survives and thrives. Group selection
theory, however, does not lead the authors "to paint a rosy picture of
universal benevolence." Instead, "group selection favors within group
niceness and between group nastiness" (9).
Group selection theory is actually not a new theory. Until a number of
biologists attacked the supposition in the 1960s, the theory had many
adherents. In recent times, however, genetic individualism has prevailed. In
turn, biological egoism has become orthodoxy in evolutionary biology; most
biologists have regarded non-kin altruism as illusory. When individuals help
others, so the current thinking goes, they do so exclusively either to
receive benefits in return or promote their own genetic self-interest.
Sober and Wilson offer their book to report and extend "a transition in
evolutionary thought" that accepts group selection as a biological basis for
affirming altruism, a transition "that is already in full swing"(7). "Many
evolutionary biologists continue to play the 'group selection is dead' song
from the 1960's with the same fondness they have for the Beatles," the
authors wryly comment. "Little wonder then, that scholars from other
disciplines who are interested in evolution have heard almost nothing about
these scientific developments" (51).
Psychological altruism has also fallen on hard times. After all, if
evolutionary altruism is absent in nature, many believe that there is no
good reason to affirm psychological altruism as truly present in human
nature. The influence that psychological egoist theory exerts, however, "far
outreaches the evidence that has been mustered on its behalf," argue the
authors (2). "The idea that human behavior is governed entirely by
self-interest and that altruistic motives don't exist has never been
supported by either a coherent theory or by a crisp and decisive set of
observations"(8).
The book divides into two major parts. In the first, the author's "task is
show the behaviors that benefit others at the expense of self can evolve."
In the second part, their "task is to understand psychological mechanisms
that evolve to motivate these adaptive behaviors" (17-18).
The basic point of the first chapter, "Altruism as a Biological Concept," is
that "altruism can evolve to the extent that altruists and non-altruists
become concentrated in different groups" (26). This concentration allows for
altruism to be maladaptive with respect to individual selection but adaptive
with respect to group selection. "To be sufficient, the differential fitness
of groups (the force favoring the altruist) must be strong enough to counter
the differential fitness of individuals within groups (the force favoring
the selfish types)" (26). In this way, altruism can evolve as selection
occurs through groups. (The authors define a group as "a set of individuals
that influence each other's fitness with respect to a certain trait, but not
the fitness of those outside the group" [92]).
The authors note that "despite the importance of motives in conventional
definitions, evolutionary biologists define altruism entirely in terms of
survival and reproduction" (17). This means that a behavior is altruistic
when it increases the survival and reproductive fitness of others and
decreases the survival and reproductive fitness of the actor.
Because of what the authors call "the averaging fallacy," a problem arises
when comparing altruism and egoism. The problem is that "a single trait can
appear to be altruistic or selfish depending on whether fitnesses are
compared within groups or averaged across groups and then compared" (32).
"When one trait is more fit than another," explain the authors, "this may be
due to pure individual selection, to pure group selection, or to a mixture
of the two. The description of the effect fails to specify what the causes
were" (33). Sober and Wilson boldly assert that "the entire history of
evolutionary biology in the last three decades, in which group selection was
rejected while other frameworks became the foundation for the study of
social behavior, would have been different if the averaging fallacy had been
avoided"(157).
The authors claim that the "evolutionary study of social behavior during the
last thirty years has reflected a massive confusion between alternative
theories that evoke different processes, on the one hand, and alternative
perspectives that view the same process in different ways, on the other"
(57). The authors believe that it is now possible to offer, as the title of
the second chapter puts it, "A Unified Evolutionary Theory of Social
Behavior." The key to this unified theory "is to achieve a legitimate
pluralism in which the different processes are distinguished from ways of
viewing the same process" (57).
To the end of achieving this legitimate pluralism, the authors consider
several major biological theories, including kin selection, fitness theory,
evolutionary game theory, selfish gene theory, and tit-for-tat strategies.
These "theories were launched as alternatives to group selection," argue
Sober and Wilson, but they are "merely different ways of looking a evolution
in group structured populations" (98). At the very least, the authors
contend, group selection, as one selection mechanism level ("multi-level
selection"), must be included in evolutionary biology's pluralist family of
theories.
The authors single out kin selection theory (which is the idea that
individuals are only altruistic toward those to whom they are genetically
related and therefore those who will pass on their genes) for particular
appraisal. "For all its insights," they maintain, "kin selection has led to
the constricted view that genealogical related is the one and only mechanism
for the evolution of altruism; because of this theory's widespread
acceptance, altruism has eclipsed adaptation as the central question of
social biology. Multi-level selection theory expands the view by focusing
on adaptation as the central question and examining the fundamental
ingredients of natural selection . . . that are required for adaptations to
evolve at all levels of the biological hierarchy. Altruism can be understood
only in this context of broader framework" (158). "Replacing kin selection
theory with multi-level selection theory," remark the authors, "is like
shutting off the spotlight and illuminating the entire stage" (332).
In the third chapter, the authors address directly how multi-level selection
relates with adaptation. They offer a procedure that involves determining
what would evolve if either (1) group selection or (2) individual selection
were the only evolutionary force, and then (3) examining the basic
ingredients of natural selection at each level of selection. "To the extent
that a trait has evolved by natural selection," explain Sober and Wilson,
"steps one and two bracket the possibilities, with real populations lying
somewhere in between. The third step involves examining the fundamental
ingredients of natural selection at each level to see where the population
is likely to lie between the two extremes of pure between group and pure
within group selection. . . . This three step procedure makes it clear that
group selection can be a significant evolutionary force in ways that do not
require groups of genetic relatives" (157).
When following this three-step procedure, multi-level selection "furnishes a
framework for understanding the evolution of our own species" (102). "When
we view our own species through the lenses of multi-level selection theory,"
the authors conclude, "we discover that human behavior cannot be placed, in
its entirety, at one point on the continuum from pure group selection to
pure individual selection" (130).
Sober and Wilson apply the theory of group selection to human evolution and
behavior. After all, multi-level theory should also demand that human groups
be evaluated in terms of the fundamental ingredients of natural selection.
The authors conclude that "human social interactions among unrelated
individuals are anything but random, and our ability to learn and to change
our behavior according to what we learn provides a powerful mechanism for
evolution of altruism and other group advantageous behaviors" (142).
In the final chapter of the book's first part, "Human Groups as Adaptive
Units," the authors address specific human cultures. These cultures were
evaluated and analyzed by a survey from the Human Relations Area Files,
which is an anthropological database designed to facilitate cross-cultural
comparisons. This intriguing chapter provides further strength to the group
selection theory. "As strange as it may seem against the background of
individualism," conclude the authors, "the concept of human groups as
adaptive units may be supported not only by evolutionary theory but by the
bulk of empirical information on human social groups in all cultures around
the world" (193). The authors summarize the chapter and the first part the
book by saying that "at the behavioral level, it is likely that much of what
people have evolved to do is for the benefit of the group" (194).
In the second part of Unto Others, the authors discuss altruism as an issue
in psychology. They begin by defining terms. Psychological egoism is defined
as the theory that all our ultimate desires are self-directed. Psychological
altruism maintains that we sometimes care about others for their own sake.
The two theories agree that people sometimes desire that others do well.
However, note the authors, "the debate concerns whether such desires are
always instrumental or are sometimes ultimate" (201).
The mind resides at the forefront of the altruism and psychology discussion.
An evolutionary perspective on human behavior, claim the authors, requires
one to "regard the human mind as a proximate mechanism for causing organisms
to produce adaptive behaviors" (200). In particular, "beliefs and desires
are items in the mind that produce behavior" (208). Yet, argue Sober and
Wilson, "an organism need not have a mind to be an evolutionary altruist."
Furthermore, "you don't have to beliefs and desires to be evolutionary
altruist" (202).
The authors summarize their thought by saying that, "in the debate between
egoism and altruism, everyone agrees that some of the desires that people
have are egoistic in character. We have suggested that individuals are able
to have these uncontroversial desires only if they have the concept of an
'I.' Being able to use this concept does not require self-awareness, but
merely self-recognition. Organisms that form perpetual beliefs that
represent objects in their environment in terms of how those objects are
related to self may plausibly be thought of as employing the concept of 'I'"
(216-17).
In one of the most helpful and provocative chapters, Sober and Wilson
examine, as the chapter title puts it, "Three Theories of Motivation." The
three theories they have in mind are hedonism, egoism, and altruism.
The authors define hedonism as the theory that "the only ultimate desires
that people have are the desires to obtain pleasure and avoid pain." "The
distinctive feature of hedonism," the authors add, "is that it says that
ultimate desires are always solipsistic" (224).
Egoism is defined as the theory that "the only ultimate goals an individual
has are self-directed; people desire their own well-being, and nothing else,
as end in itself"(224). The point is made that, although all hedonists are
egoists, not all egoists are hedonists. After all, an egoist may desire pain
for herself and avoid experiencing personal pleasure.
Altruism is defined as the theory that "people sometimes care about the
welfare of others as an end in itself." The authors quickly note that they
regard altruism as "part of the pluralistic theory of motivation that
maintains that people have ultimate desires about others as well as about
themselves." This means that their version of altruism "is quite compatible
with the existence of widespread selfishness" (228). However, pluralism and
egoism, as they define them, are incompatible, because egoism claims that
people ultimately desire nothing but their own well-being.
The authors remark that their theory of pluralistic motivation can be said
to describe an organism's behavior in two ways. "One possibility is that
some of the actions the organism performs are caused solely by altruistic
ultimate motives while others are caused just by egoistic ultimate motives."
Another possibility is that an organism's actions "are caused by both
altruistic and egoistic ultimate motives" (308).
Sober and Wilson examine the common practice of equating altruism and
morality. They make several important claims. They claim that, first,
morality does not always require one to sacrifice self-interest for the sake
of others. Second, being motivated by an altruistic desire is not the same
as being motivated by a moral principle. Third, altruistically motivated
actions can be morally wrong, while selfishly motivated actions may be
morally required. Finally, altruism, as the authors understand it, does not
require that one care about the welfare of another for purely other-directed
reasons: "the hypothesis does not rule out the possibility that instances of
helping are sometimes or even always accompanied by ultimate motives that
are self-directed" (246).
Chapters eight and nine are less provocative than previous chapters. The
authors examine psychological evidence and determine that this evidence does
not prove conclusively whether or not human beings ever have altruistic
ultimate motives. The evidence, however, does not prove the egoist
hypothesis either. The main reason that psychological evidence does not
wholly confirm the truth of egoism or altruism (or pluralism) is that,
according to the authors, introspection does not inerrantly reveal to us our
ultimate desires. The authors draw the same conclusion when discussing the
philosophical arguments regarding egoism and altruism (or pluralism) as they
did when discussing the psychological evidence for the debate. That is, they
conclude that philosophical arguments are inconclusive.
The book's final chapter shows how evolutionary considerations bear on the
question of psychological motivation. The authors intrepidly claim that "no
version of egoism is plausible for organisms such as ourselves" (297), by
which they apparently mean that egoism, when defined as the theory that the
only ultimate goals an individual ever has are self-directed, is not
plausible as an explanation of human behavior. At the center of the
chapter's discussion is the parent-child relationship. "We can conjecture
that human parents typically want their children to do well -- to live
rather than die, to be healthy rather than sick, and so on," state Sober and
Wilson. "The question we will address is whether this desire is merely an
instrumental desire in the service in some egoistic ultimate goal, or part
of a pluralistic motivational system in which there is an ultimate
altruistic concern for the child's welfare. We will argue that there are
evolutionary reasons to expect motivational pluralism to be the proximate
mechanism for producing parental care in our species" (302). In fact,
"parental care would be more reliably produced by purely altruistic motives
than by purely hedonistic motives" (319).
In a chapter subsection entitled, "A Continuum of Cognitive Capacities," the
authors note that humans and other organisms are cognitively limited. The
authors lay out a continuum in which a simple conditionable organism at one
end of the continuum has no, or virtually no, cognitive abilities. At the
other end of the continuum is the hypothetical individual with unlimited
cognitive abilities. "Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that
cognition began to evolve in organisms that already had the capacity to
experience pleasure and pain," the authors venture. "Even if the first
organisms that had desires were hedonists, what circumstances could make it
selectively advantageous for organisms to depart from the dictates of
hedonism by having some of their behaviors regulated by purely altruistic
motives?" (311) The answer given is that those organisms with greater
cognitive resources might be motivated to be pluralistically motivated. In
fact, the authors eventually contend that "pluralism was probably available
ancestrally, if hedonism was" (322).
Those organisms with sophisticated cognitive abilities have greater capacity
for, and reason to, act upon pluralistic motivations. "The obvious
evolutionary strategy for an organism that can form reliable beliefs about
its own body and about the welfare of relevant others," conclude the
authors, "is for it to set its eyes on the prize." The organism's "ultimate
desire should include a concern for something that is far more important in
terms of evolutionary success than the states of its own consciousness"
(324).
The authors conclude their discussion of how psychological altruism evolved
by tying together the example of the parent-child relationship with group
selection theory. "Just as motivational pluralism is a plausible design
solution for the problem of getting parents to take care of their children,
so pluralism is a plausible design solution for the problem of getting
members of a group to take care of each other" (326). In short, "evolution
has made us motivational pluralists, not egoists or hedonists" (327).
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The views expressed in the forwarded article(s) are provided for negentropy
and do not necessarily represent those of Alligator Grundy.
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Useless hypotheses, etc.:
consciousness, phlogiston, philosophy, vitalism, mind, free will, qualia,
analog computing, cultural relativism, GAC, Cyc, Eliza, cryonics, individual
uniqueness, ego, human values
Everything that can happen has already happened, not just once,
but an infinite number of times, and will continue to do so forever.
(Everything that can happen = more than anyone can imagine.)
We won't move into a better future until we debunk religiosity, the most
regressive force now operating in society.
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