Mark quoted:
>> Actually, I do find that I can get by from day to day making very few
>> *moral* judgments, as opposed to having personal responses, tastes, etc.
And commented...
>I wonder what you might say about, e.g.,
>1. The 20-60 million Soviet citizens that Stalin had eliminated in the
>Gulag. I know you want to resist saying that what he did was morally wrong,
>so what do you say? What Stalin did was, what? Gauche?
Well, first, I said that I get by from day to day without making many moral
judgments. I didn't say I *never* make substantive moral judgments.
Since it is damn hard to reconstruct language, I'd actually say that what
Stalin did was morally wrong. :)
However, I'd have to add, if the conversation got more complex, that I am
not claiming there is an objective property of moral wrongness, and I'd
acknowledge that, to the extent my language implies there is such a
property, it is misleading. I am appalled at the acts of Hitler, Stalin,
etc, but this is based on my own values, not on a serious claim that their
actions had some objective metaphysical property of "wrongness". *That* is
not what I react to when I have a moral response to such actions.
I add that it often turns out that people who did things I find appalling
have wildly wrong factual, or quasi-factual (perhaps metaphysical) beliefs.
Hitler thought that the Jews were sub-human, had inferior blood, were
parasites, culture destroyers, were engaged in destructive conspiracies
against the rest of humankind, etc, etc. Given these beliefs, some of his
prescriptions may have been arguable from values many of us would share.
This suggests to me that some memes of a supposedly factual nature are
nonetheless incredibly dangerous and destructive. Hypothetical imperative:
*if* we wish to avoid such outcomes (as I do), we should oppose these memes
strongly. I take racism very seriously. Similar, though more difficult,
issues arise with Stalin.
>2. Do you see any _significant_ difference between treating people as
means
>and ends? Obviously there is no moral difference as far as your concerned.
>Is this a distinction without a difference for you?
Well, if you are asking me whether I have any values other than
self-interest, and whether these include valuing the rationality, autonomy
etc of other people, or valuing other people's happiness, yes I do value
these things. I recognise them as moral constraints on my actions in the
sense that if I seek to act on my values I will sometimes act in ways that
are not self-interested (except in a trivial sense) or merely spontaneous.
Thus, as an ethical subjectivist (or an error theorist if I follow Mackie in
thinking that ordinary ethical language has an objectivist element built
into it), I can still recognise constraints on my self-interested or
spontaneous actions. Such contraints are at the core of normative ethics. If
there are some things that my values and commitments constrain me from doing
self-interestedly or spontaneously to other people, this entails that I am
constrained from treating those people *merely* as ends (which is what Kant
actually said). I have a reason, other than self-interest, to treat them in
certain ways.
>3. Why do you think that you and your ilk
I have an "ilk" now, do I? <g> I realise that "ilk" just means something
like "kind", but this expression is often used, these days, to express
disgust or contempt. Jeeze, I hope that's not the case here.
>should revise our language to
>attempt to expunge moral claims?
"should" in what sense? Are you suggesting that there is some categorical
imperative on the loose? *If* I want to be accurate, then I will be
interested (all other things being equal) in using language that is
accurate. This is a hypothetical imperative dependent on my own values. I
don't understand what is supposed to be wrong with that. By the way, I am
not a *relativist*. I am certainly not a truth-relativist. I think you *can*
be accurate about these things, even if an accurate statement turns out to
be inconvenient in some way.
> I would have thought that you would prefer
>to use moral language to attempt to manipulate others--to get them to
>acquiesce to your preferences--given that so many others believe in the
>"myth" of moral claims.
But why assume that I am motivated purely by self-interest (except perhaps
in some trivial sense)? Perhaps I actually value the truth about these
issues more than getting others to acquiesce in my other value
preferences. Ethical subjectivism is a meta-ethical position; it does not,
without more, entail the rejection of any particular normative ethical
position. The error theory is simply the theory that our usual ethical
language is permeated by ethical realist or objectivist thinking, coupled
with a rejection of the existence of objective moral properties. It does not
entail the rejection of particular normative ethical positions if they are
reconstructed as subjectivist positions.
Having said that, I do not entirely agree with what seems to be the
philosophical orthodoxy that meta-ethical theories leave everything
normative *just as it was*. I think that subjectivists and error theorists
are likely to reason about normative ethical matters in a way that is subtly
different from that of ethical realists. Of course, "subtly" is an important
word,
here. Then again, subtle differences in approach can compound to large
substantive differences.
Wouldn't it be more _effective_ for you to pretend
>that it is immoral for others to interfere with your liberty to pursue your
>own version of the good, even though you are privy to the truth that moral
>discourse is a sham? Why not keep the moral language and use it as a mask
to
>hide your will to power?
More "effective" for what end that you imagine I seek? As it happens, one of
my deepest commitments is to freedom. However, I don't believe that an
objective moral property of "goodness" attaches to freedom.
Besides, if I masked my meta-ethical views, I couldn't have discussions like
this, could I? Well, I suppose I could, but the discussion would be
unsatisfying if I did not reveal my actual views. Perhaps power isn't all I
want.
> Moi? I am a skeptic--at least I think I am. Error theorists like
Mackie,
>seem to me, presuppose way too much knowledge of Being. I am inclined to
>think that there may be more things in heaven and earth than our dreamed of
>in our human, all too human, philosophy. If one is a skeptic like me then
it
>is appropriate to reason as follows: If there are moral facts or
properties,
>and we reason and act if there are such, then we will be better off. If
>there are no moral facts or properties, and we reason and act if there are
>such, then we will be better off. Why? Because to think there might be
moral
>truths is comforting, and it will tend to make everyone behave better.
Mark's version of Pascal's wager, then?
Russell
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