Earlier, scerir wrote:
>
> In the original paper (circa 1957) about the "Relative State Interpretation"
> (now "Many Worlds Interpretation") H. Everett III does not say that
> all possible world histories are *real* or equally *real*.
>
> Gell-Mann, in example, says that every each world history has,
> as usual, a probability attached.
All respect to Gell-Mann, but, when something is already known to have
happened, why then, the probability of the real occurrence is equal to
100%, in that particular timeline of course. At the same time, there is
apparently no telling if the probabilities in other timelines are also
firmly based in real occurrences there.
>
> Otherwise it is not easy to normalize, that is to compute the entropy
> involved in a quantum measurement.
>
Try looking up the the "complete" version of what entropy is all about
in Chapter 4 of _Nanosystems_, and also the paradox that Drexler
describes for defining the entropy of a "glassy crystal" in the glossary
entry for "entropy" at the back of the book. The point is that entropy
strictly depends on the state of knowledge of the observer who doe the
analysis of any given system. For instance, while this
knowledge-dependent definition may seem non-standard, it is actually
true that a gas has more entropy than a crystal, precisely because it is
so much more difficult to *measure* the molecular positions in the gas.
What I'm getting at is, I am not following just how it is that any real
alternate timelines are supposed to interfere with these knowledge-based
entropy calculations?
David Blenkinsop <blenl@sk.sympatico.ca>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Oct 02 2000 - 17:38:36 MDT