I doubt that the fact/value distinction holds up under close scrutiny. What
seem like values almost always represent positions held only contingent on
certain factual assumptions. Take, for example, valuing "the environment."
Though proponents of environmentalism often present it as a per se good, they
in truth accept certain claims--industrialism increases human suffering,
ecosystems exist in balanced harmony absent human intervention, population
growth increases pollution, and so forth--that may or may not be facts. Only
at a very fundamental, arational level--seek social status, maximize
pleasure/pain ratios, reproduce, and so forth--do values not rely on beliefs
about facts. And at that level, almost everyone agrees.
>Under standard accounts, decisions are made by combining positions
>on values and beliefs about facts. One considers all the possible
>relevant states of the world, and beliefs about facts are about how
>likely each state is given each action, while positions on values
>are about how much one would like each state compared to the others.
>
>People on this list seem to disagree with those not here about many
>decisions, so it can make sense to ask: do those disagreements tend
>to be more about values, or more about facts?
>
>If we mainly disagree due to differing opinions about the possible
>future paths of human technology, or about the effects of political
>interventions on economic progress, or about how happy people would
>feel if they modified themselves in various ways, then we are
>disagreeing mainly about facts.
>
>If we mainly disagree due to our putting a larger weight on future
>consequences, or a large weight on being influential in whatever
>future comes, or to being less repelled by being highly modified,
>or to being less concerned about inequality or to biosphere losses,
>or to expecting more dramatic technological progress, then we are
>disagreeing mainly about values.
>
>There is less scope for being "right" in disagreements about values.
>Once we understand what we want, and opponents decide they don't want
>that, there isn't that much more to say to them. "Advocacy" then
>consists mostly in seeking out people who haven't considered the
>issue and getting them to pick sides. And if there end up being
>lots more of them than of us, we may just lose big time.
>
>There is more to say when we and opponents disagree about facts,
>because in that case we fundamentally share the same interests, and
>are just trying to deal with asymmetric information. But in that
>case we should take very seriously the fact that others disagree
>with us. Even if they haven't articulated their reasoning to our
>satisfaction, we have also failed to do so for them, and assuming
>they aren't stupid we have to realize that they may know things
>that show why we are wrong.
>
>So which is it, do our disagreements with opponents tend to be more
>about values, or more about facts?
>
>
>Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
>Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
>MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
>703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
>
>
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T.0. Morrow
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