> At 02:23 PM 22/06/99 -0400, Harvey wrote:
Damien Broderick <email@example.com> replied > Exactly. This is just Searle's Chinese Room by other means.
Except that Searle comes to exactly the OPPOSITE conclusion.
He says that there is no consciousness in this case. He explicitly denies
that if a result is computed by parts, then consciousness is a distributed
property of those parts.
That is his whole point - that is why he is so bitterly against functionalists like Dennett.
My Favorite net-quote on this is below:
In Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy, ADRIAN MOHAMMED wrote: > I need as much information as possible about Searle's Chinese Room
Jim Balter <firstname.lastname@example.org> replied:
It's a demonstration that you can't understand the philosophy of the mind merely by virtue of being known as a philosopher of the mind.
Dr Timothy Bates
Sydney NSW 2109
ph 61 2 9850 8623
FAX 61 2 9850 8062