Re: Evolved Preferences

Eric Watt Forste (arkuat@pobox.com)
Tue, 29 Apr 1997 14:29:16 -0700


Robin Hanson writes:
>Let me suggest that it is useful to distinguish the evolution of
>values from the evolution of "facts", or beliefs about facts. The
>space of possible basic values is much smaller than the space of
>possible fact beliefs;

This is an asymmetrical comparison because you use the word "basic"
on only one side. I doubt that the space of possible basic values
is much smaller than the space of possible general epistemic
principles (reasons for choosing to treat a piece of information in your
head as if it were factual). I also doubt that the space of possible
specific valuations in concrete situations is much smaller than the
space of possible beliefs.

>so I think it is plausible to think in terms of an evolutionary
>equilibrium of values even when fact discovery is still going
>strong.

You can't value or disvalue what you can neither perceive nor think
about, and the pace of fact discovery is increasing the number of things
that we can perceive and think about. This is particularly the case in
neuropsychology, economics, and human ethology. I wish that the current
human cultural situation represented an evolutionary equilibrium of
values (it would make me feel much safer), but this is such a complex
question that I am cautious about prematurely closing it.

New knowledge may have no logical effect on values, but I'm quite sure
it has a psychological effect on values. And rates of knowledge change
have been geographically lumpy over the last few hundred years. This
argues against the idea that current human values are in equilibrium.

--
Eric Watt Forste ++ arkuat@pobox.com ++ http://www.pobox.com/~arkuat/