Lee Corbin <lcorbin@ricochet.net> responded:
> I have studied it at length, and I think that there are some very
> valid points there, but I don't think that we mean the same thing by
> "consciousness", and I know that we don't mean the same thing by
> "zombie".
I'm also fascinated with this topic and I'd love to have you
review my "Qualia theory of Consciousness" paper located here:
HTML version: <URL: http://www.frii.com/~allsop/qualia.htm>
MS Word version: <URL: http://www.frii.com/~allsop/qualia.doc>
> I would heartily recommend that you read parts of Daniel Dennett's
> "Consciousness Explained",
My paper's theory (of course it could be a mistaken theory) is
that eliminative materialists, like Dennett are completely wrong.
Dennett basically says in that book: we don't have qualia "It just
seems like we do". But of course, according to a representational
qualia theory, such a statement is absurd and self contradictory. A
"seeming", according to this theory, is simply a conscious
representation of knowledge that incorrectly represents it's referent.
But how can you have conscious knowledge (conscious knowledge is, by
definition, constructed of qualia) that is incorrect? If he says such
a thing, he should at least make an attempt to give some model of what
such an incorrect "seeming" is and how our knowledge, whatever he
thinks it is, (his "multiple drafts" blather certainly doesn't seem to
capture it in any way I can comprehend) can be mistaken about such a
thing.
Anyway, I go over this and much more in my paper. I'd love to
get your feedback on this if you have a chance.
Thanks
Brent Allsop
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