Re: law enforcement for profit

From: \[ Robert-Coyote \] (
Date: Wed May 24 2000 - 10:08:11 MDT

Who owns the roads?

Jurisdiction over interstate commerce is reserved
to Congress, and must be delegated to the State.

“It is in the 8th section of the second article, we are to look for cessions
of territory and of exclusive jurisdiction.”

“Congress may pass all laws which are necessary and proper for giving the
most complete effect to this power. Still, the general jurisdiction over the
place, subject to this grant of power, adheres to the territory, as a
portion of sovereignty not yet given away.”

“Consistent with this structure, we have identified three broad categories
of activity that congress may regulate under its commerce power. (Cites
omitted) First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. (Cites omitted) (“‘[T]he authority of Congress to keep the
channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has
been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.’” (quoting
Carminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491, 37 S.Ct. 192, 197, 61 L.Ed.
442 (1917)) Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.
(Cites omitted) Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, (Cites omitted) those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce. (Cite omitted)”

“We do not say that a case may not arise in which it will be found that a
State, under the form of regulating its own affairs, has encroached upon the
exclusive domain of Congress in respect to interstate commerce…”

“But we think it may safely be said that State legislation which seeks to
impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or to interfere directly
with its freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress.”

“It is impossible to see any distinction in its effect upon commerce of
either class, between a statute which regulates the charges for
transportation, and a statute which levies a tax for the benefit of the
State upon the same transportation; and, in fact, the judgment of the court
in the State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, rested upon the ground that
the tax was always added to the cost of transportation, and thus was a tax
upon the privilege of carrying the goods through the State.”

“It is not the railroads themselves that are regulated by this act of the
Illinois Legislature so much as the charge for transportation, and, in the
language just cited, of each one of the States through whose territories
these goods are transported can fix its own rules for prices, for modes of
transit, for times and modes of delivery, and all the other incidents of
transportation to which the word “regulation” can be applied, it is readily
seen that the embarrassments upon interstate transportation, as an element
of interstate commerce, might be too oppressive to be submitted to. “It
was,” in the language of the court cited above, “to meet just such a case
that the commerce clause of the Constitution was adopted.”

“As such, so far as it operates on private messages sent out of the State,
it is a regulation of foreign and interstate commerce and beyond the power
of the State. That is fully established by the cases already cited.”

“Commerce with foreign countries and among the States, strictly considered,
consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation and
the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the
purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. For the regulation of commerce
as thus defined there can be only one system of rules, applicable alike to
the whole country; and the authority that can act for the whole country can
alone adopt such a system. Action upon it by separate States is not,
therefore, permissible. Language confirming the exclusiveness of the grant
of power over commerce as thus defined may not be inaccurate, when it would
be so applied to legislation upon subjects which are merely auxiliary to

“And if it be a regulation of commerce, …it must be of that national
character, and the regulation can only appropriately exist by general rules
and principles, which demand that it should be done by the Congress of the
United States under the commerce clause of the Constitution.”

“The Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 requires all States to meet
the same minimum standards for testing and licensing commercial drivers. All
commercial drivers throughout the United States are required to have a
Commercial Driver’s License (CDL).”

“…the grant [the commerce clause] established the immunity of interstate
commerce from the control of the States respecting all those subjects
embraced within the grant which are of such a nature as to demand that, if
regulated at all, their regulation must be prescribed by a single
authority.” Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346,

“The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national
citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment against state interference. Mr. Justice Moody in
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, stated, “Privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States … are only such as arise out of the nature
and essential character of the National Government, or are specifically
granted or secured to all citizens or persons by the Constitution of the
United States.” And went on to state that one of those rights of national
citizenship was “the right to pass freely from State to State.” Id. P.97.”

“…But [Mr. Justice Miller in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1867)]’s
failure to classify that right as one of state citizenship underscores his
view that the free movement of persons throughout this nation was a right of
national citizenship.”

“…Thus it is plain that the right of free ingress and egress rises to a
higher constitutional dignity than that afforded by state citizenship.”

RCW “46.30.010 Legislative intent. It is a privilege granted by the state to
operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state.”

Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition:
“Privilege. A particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a
person, company, or class, beyond the common advantages of other citizens.
An exceptional or extraordinary power or exemption. A peculiar right,
advantage, exemption, power, franchise, or immunity held by a person or
class, not generally possessed by others.”

“License. A personal privilege to do some particular act or series of acts
on land without possessing any estate or interest therein, and is ordinarily
revocable at the will of the licensor and is not assignable. (Cite omitted)
The permission by competent authority to do an act which, without such
permission, would be illegal, a trespass, a tort, or otherwise not

“Easement. A right of use over the property of another.”

“Private or public easements. A private easement is one in which the
enjoyment is restricted to one or a few individuals, while a public easement
is one the right to enjoyment of which is vested in the public generally or
in an entire community; such as an easement of passage on the public streets
and highways or of navigation on a stream.”

“Having regard to form alone, the act here is an offer to the private
carrier of a privilege, which the state may grant or deny, upon a condition
which the carrier is free to accept or reject. In reality, the carrier is
given no choice, except a choice between the rock and the whirlpool-an
option to forgo a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood or submit
to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden.”

2.9 Congress’ exclusive authority and original jurisdiction over the
Defendant’s use of the highways, and the Plaintiff’s lack of original
jurisdiction over the Defendant’s private travel upon the highways now
having been firmly established, Defendant will proceed.

C. Delegation of Authority from Congress to the
State of Washington.


§ 31301. Definitions.
In this chapter -
        (3) "commercial driver's license" means a license issued by a State to an
individual authorizing the individual to operate a class of commercial motor
        (6) "driver's license" means a license issued by a State to an individual
authorizing the individual to operate a motor vehicle on highways.
        (11) "motor vehicle" means a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or
semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on public
streets, roads, or highways, but does not include a vehicle, machine,
tractor, trailer, or semitrailer operated only on a rail line or custom
harvesting farm machinery.

§ 31308. Commercial driver's license.
        After consultation with the States, the Secretary of Transportation shall
prescribe regulations on minimum uniform standards for the issuance of
commercial drivers' licenses by the States and for information to be
contained on each of the licenses. The standards shall require at a minimum
that -
(1) an individual issued a commercial driver's license pass written and
driving tests for the operation of a commercial motor vehicle that comply
with the minimum standards prescribed by the Secretary under section
31305(a) of this title;
(2) the license be tamperproof to the maximum extent practicable; and
(3) the license contain -
(A) the name and address of the individual issued the license and a physical
description of the individual;
(B) the social security account number or other number or information the
Secretary decides is appropriate to identify the individual;
(C) the class or type of commercial motor vehicle the individual is
authorized to operate under the license;
(D) the name of the State that issued the license; and
(E) the dates between which the license is valid.

18 USC 31.- “Motor vehicle” means every description or other contrivance
propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on
the highways in the transportation of passengers, or passengers and

        2.14 It is clear that the legislative body with the exclusive 2.17 The
Constitution for Washington state does bestow some authority upon the
legislature to regulate the activities upon the highways, and does so under
Article 12, § 13 which reads as follows:

“All railroad, canal and other transportation companies are declared to be
common carriers and subject to legislative control. Any association or
corporation organized for the purpose, under the laws of this state, shall
have the right to connect at the state line with railroads of other states.
Every railroad company shall have the right with its road, whether the same
be now constructed or may hereafter be constructed, to intersect, cross or
connect with any other railroad, and when such railroads are of the same or
similar gauge they shall at all crossings and at all points, where a
railroad shall begin or terminate at or near any other railroad, form proper
connections so that the cars of any such railroad companies may be speedily
transferred from one railroad to another. All railroad companies shall
receive and transport each the other's passengers, tonnage and cars without
delay or discrimination.

RCW 46.98.020 Provisions to be construed in pari materia.
The provisions of this title shall be construed in pari materia even though
as a matter of prior legislative history they were not originally enacted in
the same statute. The provisions of this title shall also be construed in
pari materia with the provisions of Title 47 RCW, and with other laws
relating to highways, roads, streets, bridges, ferries and vehicles. This
section shall not operate retroactively.

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