> > There is not even any
> > real debate about what such a process would do: everyone knows
> > exactly what the result of such a copying process would likely do,
> > how each thing would likely feel and behave; there simply aren't
> > any interesting facts in controversy here.
> Hell, yes, there are. If I'm facing a choice whether to be copied, should
> I expect this self-awareness to continue in the original? Or continue in
> either the original or the copy, with a 50% probability of each? If I'm
> facing a choice whether to step into the (Star Trek) transporter, then the
> first possibility above would mean that my self-awareness would cease 100%
> of the time, and the second possibility would mean that my self-awareness
> would cease 50% of the time. Neither of which sound very appealing to me.
> The end of my self-awareness, my sense of ego, is what I call "death", nor
> is this merely a semantic matter.
I don't think anyone in this debate is seriously arguing non-materialism;
it has been long conceded that if one reproduces atom-for-atom the mass of
flesh that is me, each reproduction will behave and feel exactly as I do
now--there is nothing "magical" about me that isn't contained wholly
within my arrangement of atoms (and perhaps their quantum states, which
are also theoretically reproducible).
The conept of "original" in this scenario is only of interest to legal
and moral (and possibly religious) arguments. No one really doubts what
the two lumps would feel like and behave like. If you want to seriously
argue non-materialism, you should probably go find a religious list
-- Lee Daniel Crocker <firstname.lastname@example.org> <http://www.piclab.com/lee/> "All inventions or works of authorship original to me, herein and past, are placed irrevocably in the public domain, and may be used or modified for any purpose, without permission, attribution, or notification."--LDC
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Jul 27 2000 - 14:11:25 MDT