At 10:43 PM 4/26/2000 -0700, email@example.com wrote:
>this URL on Borda counting, ...
>claims Borda is highly manipulable. But it also seems to criticize it for not
>electing the Cordorcet winner, whereas Saari claims that is a false goal.
>Elsewhere I've seen Saari say that anything which will break Borda will break
>any other scheme as well. And there's also this on Borda manipulation:
I never cared that much for Borda counting, but I do like approval
voting, which is intuitive and easy to explain, and
does seems to clearly improve on simple plurality.
For listeners: approval voting is where each voter gets to vote for as many
or few candidates as you want. The winners is the one with the most votes.
Robin Hanson firstname.lastname@example.org http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Jul 27 2000 - 14:09:53 MDT