>Reilly Jones wrote:
>> Recently, I ran across an analysis of this same point by the philosopher
>> Etienne Gilson [snip] Being and truth are, of course, different aspects
of the
>> same ontological primitive.
Gregory commented:
>If so then is truth as static as being? I'm not interested in platonic
>primitives. I'll take becoming and usefulness over the concepts of being
>and truth.
Reilly's invocation of Gilson strikes me as odd in the extreme. Gilson is a
Catholic Aristotelian in the Thomist tradition. BTW, I take it that
Gregory's use of `ontotheological' reflects the influence of Heidegger or
perhaps Derrida? I raise these perhaps pedantic-seeming points because I
consider issues of filiation extremely useful, if only as range-finding
devices in such discussions.
Damien Broderick