> I don't understand what you mean by your Omega point assumption. But how
> about we start with a simple example, and then see where it needs to be more
> complicated, eh? Let's assume that in every possible state of the universe
> you will eventually come to some "end" conclusion about ethics.
Well, that provides me with the easiest way of explaining my Omega point
claim. If I reach an Omega point, I won't necessarily come to any "end"
at all; I could have an infinite number of beliefs about ethics, each
following from the previous set.
If I die, you may at least report my beliefs at death, but *without* some
end of inquiry, it's hard to guess what your computation will report.
> Now consider the factual question of whether human's ancestral tribes are
> more like bonobo or baboon tribes. You realize that this matters for human
> ethics. Bonobo is the answer in sets A and C, while baboons are the answer
> in states B and D.
How in heaven's name did you find out any of THAT? You just all of a
sudden "realized" not only that the fact-value distinction is bunk, but
also that this particular fact can help settle the matter? How could you
establish this connection without begging the question against the
fact-value distinction? What empirical work would fix this point?
Again, there is some empirical component to ethics, and that element is
fully computable. If I'm worried about whether you committed a wrong
yesterday, then finding out the empirical fact that you mugged a few
innocents will help settle the question. However, you have to do some
ethical philosophy *before* facts like those become relevant. In this
case, you could determine that I believe that the bonobo/baboon question
is ethically relevant and work from there. (I don't, but suppose I did.)
But you're far away from establishing questions like deontology vs. virtue
theory, utilitarianism vs. egoism, welfarism vs. objective good, etc. none
of which have the empirical component, and without whose resolution it
seems unlikely that you'll know very much about ethics.
Let's work with a particular S, namely, that deontology is a more accurate
theory than virtue theory. How would I realize that an empirical
component would settle this question? What sort of empirical facts would
I want to know?
Is this simply a confusion of what sorts of questions ethics asks most of
the time?
I'll grant that if this assumption which you stipulate could be
established empirically, you'd be right.
> Hopefully this has all been standard so far. Now we do the think you seem
> to think is hard. There are these same sets A,B,C,D with the same prior and
> the same relation to S, but we drop the bonobo/baboon interpretation of A,C
> vs. B,D. Now A,C are the sets where I just tell you that you will now have
> a 25% chance of agreeing with S, while B,D are the sets where I tell you its
> a 33% chance. Upon hearing this you update your beliefs to be consistent
> with the claim I just made. Ta da, I have fully taken into account the
> effect of my statement on you.
Excuse me? I had those priors for a reason (presumably) and having you
tell me "Your priors will be the following" doesn't give me any reason, as
such, for agreeing with you. If I had somehow realized that bonobo thing,
I'd buy this argument, but without that realization, I have no reason to
update my priors to the ones you reccomend.
> I don't understand your objection. It seemed well-posed and verifiable
> to me. I you want to be clearer about verifiability, assume that the
> identity of the atom was encoded in a light beam sent off to another
> star, and the signal would return in ten years.
This is a very different case, IMO. (Instead, BTW, I can just write down
its location on a piece of paper and lock it in a safe. Cheaper that
way.)
In THAT case, we could imagine that if you knew enough about
cognitive science, you could analyze the current physical state of my
brain to determine my current beliefs about which atom I'd chosen,
determine the mass of that atom, and report it. All purely empirical.
However, my current beliefs are *not* fully determinable based on the
current state of my brain. If you had a perfect image of my brain stored
on file, given however long you wanted to look at it, you wouldn't even be
able to tell what my beliefs would be like in 20 years, say nothing of the
end of inquiry. My beliefs have been informed both by my own internal
cogitations as well as things which happen TO me, things which you can't
predict merely by looking at my brain. So this analogy *definitely*
doesn't carry over in this case.
Hal raised the point of ethical realism, but I don't think I need to stake
out so strong a position to refute your argument.
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
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