Bryan Moss <bryan.moss@dial.pipex.com> responded:
> Madame Ubiquitous wrote:
> > > The only way to settle this dispute is to find evidence
> > > that qualia do not exist.
> >
> > Eeeerm...
> >
> > Doesn't the burden of proof rest on the positive
> > assertion?
> No proof...
> If we find a mechanism by which qualia *appear* to exist, this would
> be convincing evidence against the assumption that qualia *do*
> exist.
Before we can make such a discovery, we must have some kind of
definition or theory of just what it means to *appear* that is
logically compatible with such a claim. The representationalist view
that argues that qualia exist defines something to incorrectly
*appear* to be a real model, made out of conscious quale
representations, in our mind, that inaccurately models it's referent.
For example, Our conscious model of a pencil partially in a
glass of water, constructed of conscious qualia, is really bent, due
to the way the sensing process, including the way light travels
through different mediums, works, even though the actual pencil in the
glass of water is not bent. Our conscious model of the pencil, in our
mind, is really bent, but it's referent isn't bent. This is what a
representationalist means when they say the pencil in the glass of
water only *appears* to be bent.
So according to this definition of what it means to *appear*
such a discovery is completely absurd and impossible. For how can we
have knowledge of, or a conscious representation of, or a real live
quale of..., that falsely represents us having qualia?
Please at least give us some help with knowing what you could
possibly mean by *appear* that at least makes some sense out of what
you are claiming could be discovered if you are going to make such
claims.
Brent Allsop
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